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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Wade Tomlinson appeals from the district court's intermediate appellate 
decision affirming his conviction for driving under the influence. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
Officer Frederick arrested Tomlinson and issued him citation for driving 
under the influence. (R., p.6.) On November 19, 2012, a Trial Status 
Memorandum ("Status Memo") was filed, which included the directive: "State is 
to prepare a formal complaint for trial. (by 1 week prior)." (R., p.24 (emphasis 
added, parenthetical original).) The Status Memo was signed by the magistrate, 
the prosecutor, and the defense attorney. (R., p.24.) Trial was initially set to 
commence on December 13, 2012. (R., p.13.) On December 7, 2012, the state 
provided Tomlinson with a copy of the "Sworn Complaint to be filed the day of 
Jury Trial." (R., pp.27-28.) 
On December 13, 2012, defense requested a continuance. (R., p.30.) 
The state did not object to the request but noted "that all witnesses including [its] 
expert were available [that day) for trial & would like consideration in the future 
regarding continuances for unavailability." (R., p.30 (minute entry).) The court 
granted the continuance and reset the case to February 12, 2013. (R.,p.30.) 
. On January 7, 2013, defense counsel requested a second continuance 
because he planned to be "out of state on the jury trial date" set for February 12, 
2013. (R., p.31.) The court granted the request on January 11, 2013, and reset 
Tomlinson's trial to March 26, 2013. (R., p.33.) Seven days later, and more than 
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two months before trial, the state provided Tomlinson with a copy of the 
"Alternative proposed Complaint to be filed the day of Jury Trial." (R., p.36.) 
On March 4, 2013, the state filed a motion in limine seeking exclusion of 
"any evidence or testimony ... regarding the measurement of uncertainty or 
margin of error for the Lifeloc FC20 device" or "the possibility that [Tomlinson's] 
blood alcohol content (BAC) was rising from the time [Tomlinson] was driving to 
the time [Tomlinson] provided a breath sample." (R., pp.40-41.) 
The day before Tomlinson's March 26 trial was to commence, defense 
counsel filed a third motion to continue noting the "calendar of available dates" 
he submitted with his second motion "did not make it clear that the 'highlighted' 
dates were the available dates versus the unavailable dates, and the current trial 
was set on unavailable [sic] date." (R., p.51.) The motion further noted that, on 
March 21, 2013, defense counsel left a message with the prosecuting attorney 
who previously signed a supplemental discovery response even though the 
March 4 motion in limine was filed by the current prosecutor assigned to the 
case, letting the attorney know he planned to request another continuance and 
that "a formal motion to continue had inadvertently not been filed." (R., pp.51-52, 
63.) Having not received a return call, or filing a "formal motion" by March 25, 
2013, defense counsel contacted the prosecutor's office again and was informed 
that a different prosecutor was assigned to the case, so he advised her of his 
intent to seek another continuance, and filed his written motion. (R., p.52.) 
Defense counsel's third motion for a continuance also noted the state's March 4 
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Motion in Limine and the fact that the state "ha[d] not requested a hearing" on 
the motion. (R., p.52.) 
On the March 26 trial date, defense counsel indicated he was not 
prepared for trial and requested a continuance; the state objected. (R., p.53.) 
The court granted the request to continue. (R., p.53.) On that same date, the 
trial court advised the parties that it would hear argument on the state's March 4 
motion in limine on the morning of trial. (See, Trial Tr., p.11, Ls.9-22.) The new 
trial date was April 17, 2013. (R., p.53.) That same date, the state filed its 
Complaint, alleging, in relevant part, that Tomlinson had "an alcohol 
concentration of .08 or more, as shown by analysis of blood, urine, or breath" in 
violation of I.C. § 18-8004(1)(a). (R., p.67.) 
The jury found Tomlinson guilty and the magistrate withheld judgment, 
imposed a mostly suspended jail sentence, with options, and placed Tomlinson 
on probation. (R., pp.76, 99.) Tomlinson timely appealed to the district court. 
(R., pp.113-114.) On intermediate appeal, Tomlinson raised two issues: (1) 
whether he was entitled to a continuance on the date his trial finally commenced 
because the state filed its formal complaint that same day; and (2) evidentiary 
error. (R., pp.135-144.) The district rejected both of Tomlinson's claims and 
affirmed his conviction. (R., pp.183-191.) Tomlinson timely appealed from the 
district court's decision. (R., pp.193-196.) 
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ISSUES 
Tomlinson states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Should Tomlinson's request for a continuance been granted 
at the time the state filed the formal COMPLAINT on the 
morning of jury trial? 
2. Was Tomlinson denied due process of law by the Court's 
erroneous rulings in matters of law and evidence? 
(Appellant's Brief in Support of Appeal ("Appellant's Brief') (capitalization 
original), p.2.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Tomlinson failed to show error in the district court's determination that 
the magistrate did not abuse its discretion by denying Tomlinson's fourth motion 
for continuance on the morning of trial? 
2. Should this Court reject Tomlinson's argument that the Idaho Supreme 
Court's interpretation of I.C. § 18-8004 in Elias-Cruz v. Idaho Department of 
Transportation, 153 Idaho 200, 280 P.3d 703 (2012), does not apply to criminal 
cases and, if it does, it should be "overturned"? Should this Court also affirm the 
district court's decision affirming the magistrate's evidentiary rulings regarding 
the relevance of certain evidence in a prosecution for driving under the influence 
using the per se theory of liability under I.C. § 18-8004 and the admissibility of 




Tomlinson Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Determination That 
The Magistrate Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Denying Tomlinson's Fourth 
Request To Continue The Trial, Made The Morning Of Trial 
A. Introduction 
Tomlinson asserts his request for a fourth continuance on the morning of 
trial should have been granted. (Appellant's Brief, pp.3-6.) Tomlinson's claim 
appears to be based on two grounds: (1) the state did not file its complaint until 
the morning of trial; and (2) the magistrate did not rule on the state's motion in 
limine before trial. (Id.) Because both grounds lack merit, Tomlinson has failed 
to show error in the district court's decision affirming the magistrate's denial of 
Tomlinson's fourth motion to continue. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate 
appellate capacity, the reviewing court "directly review[s] the district court's 
decision." State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709,711,184 P.3d 215,217 (Ct. App. 
2008) (citing Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008)). The 
appellate court "examine[s] the magistrate record to determine whether there is 
substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact 
and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those findings." lg_,_ 
"If those findings are so supported and the conclusions follow therefrom and if 
the district court affirmed the magistrate's decision, [the appellate court] affirm[s] 
the district court's decision as a matter of procedure." lg_,_ (citing Losser, 145 
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Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758; Nicholls v. Blaser, 102 Idaho 559, 633 P.2d 1137 
(1981 )). 
"The decision to grant or deny a motion for continuance is within the 
discretion of the district court." State v. Thorngren, 149 Idaho 729, 736, 240 
P.3d 575, 582 (2010) (citing State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 567, 199 P.3d 123, 
142 (2008)). In reviewing discretionary decisions, this Court conducts a three-
part inquiry, examining whether the trial court "(1) perceived the issue as one of 
discretion; (2) acted within the bounds of that discretion and consistent with 
established legal standards; and (3) reached its decision through the exercise of 
reason." lsL. "In the context of a motion for a continuance, an appellant must 
show that his or her substantial rights were prejudiced by reason of the denial of 
a motion for continuance." lsL. (citing State v. Evans, 129 Idaho 758, 762, 932 
P.2d 881, 885 (1997)). 
C. The District Court Correctly Concluded The Magistrate Did Not Abuse Its 
Discretion In Denying Tomlinson's Fourth Motion To Continue 
In support of his claim of error in relation to the denial of his fourth request 
for a continuance, made on the morning of trial, Tomlinson notes that the "state 
filed a formal complaint that could be interpreted as an attempt to proceed 'per 
[sic] se."' (Appellant's Brief, p.3.) Tomlinson characterizes the filing of the 
complaint as an "amendment the morning of trial" and complains he was 
"prejudiced" by the "amendment" because he "prepared for trial based on the 
citation issued the night of the incident." (Appellant's Brief, p.4.) These 
assertions are disingenuous and did not warrant a continuance. 
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Tomlinson correctly notes that the state did not file its complaint with the 
court until the morning of trial - April 17, 2013. (R., pp.66-67.) However, 
Tomlinson's characterization of this complaint as an "amendment" on the 
morning of trial is belied by the record. The state first provided Tomlinson with a 
complaint on December 7, 2012, and notified him of its intent to file it with the 
court on the day of trial. (See R., pp.27-28.) Approximately six weeks later, and 
three months before trial finally commenced, the state provided Tomlinson with a 
copy of its "[a]lternative proposed Complaint," and again notified Tomlinson the 
complaint would be filed with the court on the day of trial. (R., pp.36-37.) Thus, 
regardless of whether the complaint was filed with the court, Tomlinson was 
provided a copy well before trial. (See Trial Tr., p.11, Ls.1-8 (prosecutor noting 
that the complaint filed the morning of trial was sent to defense counsel on 
January 18, 2013).) 
At trial, defense counsel, whose name appears on the certificates of 
service related to both complaints (compare R., pp.28, 37 with Trial Tr.), claimed 
he "just received" the complaint the morning of trial and asserted he "prepared 
for trial and proceeded on the fact that is [sic] says DUI on the citation, which 
was all we were provided with" (Trial Tr., p.9, Ls.21-24). This claim is obviously 
inconsistent with documentary evidence that the state provided counsel with the 
complaints. Nevertheless, even assuming defense counsel prepared for trial 
based on the citation, a claim he reasserts on appeal (Appellant's Brief, p.4), that 
fact does not demonstrate that the state amended its complaint on the morning 
of trial, much less that was entitled to a continuance on that basis. Indeed, if, as 
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Tomlinson claims, he "prepared for trial based on the citation issued the night of 
the incident" (Appellant's Brief, p.4), it is unclear why he was not prepared to 
proceed to trial on both of the theories available to the state under I.C. § 18-
8004, since the citation merely referenced the code section. (R., p.6.) To claim, 
as he seems to do, that he was unprepared to defend against a "per se" theory 
because the state did not file its complaint until the morning of trial is inconsistent 
with his reliance on the citation, and inconsistent with other information provided 
by the state, namely, the motion in limine filed on March 4. The district court 
correctly rejected Tomlinson's claim that he was entitled to a continuance based 
on when the state filed its complaint with the court. (R., p.188.) 
Tomlinson's second argument in relation to his request for a continuance 
is based on his assertion that his due process rights were violated because the 
state did not file a notice of hearing for its motion in limine prior to trial and the 
magistrate did not enter a written order ruling on the motion prior to trial. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.3-5.) These arguments are contrary to law. 
The state's failure to file a notice of hearing for its motion in limine is 
ultimately irrelevant to resolution of Tomlinson's claim that he was entitled to a 
fourth continuance on the morning of trial because Tomlinson had verbal notice 
of when the motion would be heard. The record reflects that, three weeks prior 
to trial, the parties discussed when the magistrate would hear argument on the 
state's motion in limine. (Trial Tr., p.11, Ls.9-18.) At that time, the magistrate 
indicated he would "take it up right before trial." (Trial Tr., p.11, Ls. 16-18, 23-
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25; see also p.12, Ls.1-9.) Contrary to Tomlinson's claim, he had notice that the 
magistrate would consider the state's motion on the day of trial. 
Tomlinson's claim that due process entitled him to a written decision on 
the motion prior to trial also lacks merit. "Due process requires an opportunity 
upon reasonable notice for a fair hearing before an impartial tribunal." Elias Cruz 
v. Idaho Deparment of Transportation, 153 Idaho 200, 204, 280 P.3d 703, 707 
(2012) (citation omitted). Tomlinson has offered no legitimate basis for 
concluding that he was deprived of notice, a fair hearing, or an impartial tribunal. 
Tomlinson's claimed entitlement to a written order prior to trial is not an element 
of due process; any claim to the contrary fails. 
Further, it is well-established that a trial court is not required to rule on a 
motion in limine prior to trial. As noted by the Idaho Supreme Court in State v. 
Hester, 114 Idaho 688, 700, 760 P.2d 27, 39 (1988): "The trial judge, in the 
exercise of his discretion, may decide that it is inappropriate to rule in advance 
on the admissibility of evidenced based on a motion in limine, but may defer his 
ruling until the case unfolds and there is a better record upon which to make his 
decision." See also State v. Dopp, 129 Idaho 597, 603, 930 P.2d 1039, 1045 (Ct. 
App. 1996). That is precisely what the magistrate did in this case - exercised his 
discretion and deferred ruling until he saw "what evidence would be presented." 
(Trial Tr., p.17, L.4 - p.18, L.4.) Tomlinson has failed to show error in the district 
court's conclusion that the magistrate did not abuse its discretion in denying 
Tomlinson's request for a fourth continuance based on the magistrate's 
consideration of the state's motion in limine. (R., p.188.) 
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11. 
Tomlinson Has Failed To Show Any Error In The District Court's Decision 
Affirming The Magistrate's Evidentiary Rulings 
A. Introduction 
Tomlinson claims the magistrate made "erroneous rulings in matters of 
law and evidence" in relation to the admissibility of certain evidence to rebut the 
prosecution's allegation of per se liability under I.C. § 18-8004. (Appellant's 
Brief, pp.6-12.) As part of his argument, Tomlinson contends the Idaho Supreme 
Court's opinion in Elias-Cruz, 153 Idaho 200, 280 P.3d 703, does not apply to 
criminal cases and, if it does, "then it needs to be overturned in the criminal 
context." (Appellant's Brief, p.11.) The district court correctly rejected this 
argument and affirmed the magistrate's evidentiary rulings. (R., pp.188-190.) 
Tomlinson also asserts evidentiary error occurred when the magistrate 
allowed admission of a printout of Tomlinson's BAC test results because, he 
claims, the BAC printout is hearsay. (Appellant's Brief, p.12.) The Court should 
decline to consider Tomlinson's claim regarding the BAC printout because it is 
not supported by argument and authority. Alternatively, the claim fails because 
the BAC printout is not hearsay. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review applicable to a decision rendered by a district 
court in its intermediate appellate capacity is set forth in Section 1.8., supra, and 
is incorporated herein by reference. 
"When a decision on a motion addressing the admissibility of evidence is 
challenged, [the appellate court] defer[s] to the trial court's findings of fact 
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supported by substantial and competent evidence." State v. Besaw, 155 Idaho 
134, 306 P.3d 219 (Ct. App. 2013), review denied. Questions of law, including 
whether the state has satisfied the foundational requirements for the admission 
of breath test results in a DUI prosecution, are subject to free review. State v. 
Carson, 133 Idaho 451, 452, 988 P.2d 225, 226 (Ct. App. 1999); State v. 
Remsburg, 126 Idaho 338, 339, 882 P.2d 993, 994 (Ct. App. 1994). 
C. The District Court Correctly Affirmed The Magistrate's Evidentiary Rulings 
Limiting The Evidence Tomlinson Could Present To Rebut The Allegation 
That He Was Guilty Of Driving Under The Influence Under A Per Se 
Theory Of Liability 
Idaho Code Section 18-8004(1 )(a) provides: 
It is unlawful for any person who is under the influence of alcohol, 
drugs or any other intoxicating substances, or any combination of 
alcohol, drugs and/or any other intoxicating substances, or who has 
an alcohol concentration of 0.08, as defined in subsection (4) of 
this section, or more, as shown by analysis of his blood, urine, or 
breath, to drive or be in actual physical control of a motor vehicle 
within this state, whether upon a highway, street or bridge, or upon 
public or private property open to the public. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has interpreted the foregoing language "as 
establishing one crime with two ways of proving a violation." State v. Robinett, 
141 Idaho 110, 112, 106 P.3d 436, 438 (2005) (citations omitted). "[T]he first 
way to prove a violation is to show under the totality of the evidence that the 
defendant was driving under the influence." !.9..,_ "The second way to prove a 
violation is to establish the defendant drove with an alcohol concentration of 0.08 
percent or more." !.9..,_ The second method is commonly referred to as the per se 
theory. See,~, State v. Juarez, 155 Idaho 449, 452, 313 P.3d 777, 780 (Ct. 
App. 2013) ("In regard to a per se violation under section 18-8004(1)(a), the 
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criminal act is having an 'alcohol concentration of 0.08 ... or more, as shown by 
analysis of his blood, urine, or breath."'). "The State may elect to proceed 
against the defendant under either or both theories of proof." Robinett, 141 
Idaho at 112, 106 P.3d at 438. Further, "[e]vidence that is relevant under one 
theory of proof is not necessarily relevant under the other." kl (citations 
omitted). 
In this case, the state proceeded under the per se theory. (Trial Tr., p.13, 
L.14 ("We'll be proceeding on a per se."); R., p.67 (complaint alleging Tomlinson 
drove "with an alcohol concentration of .08 or more, as shown by analysis of 
blood, urine, or breath, which is in violation of Idaho Code § 18-8004(a)(a)").) 
Given the state's theory, the prosecutor moved in limine to exclude evidence that 
is not relevant to a per se allegation. (R., pp.40-44.) Specifically, the state 
moved to exclude evidence "regarding the measurement of uncertainty or margin 
of error for the Lifeloc FC20 device" and evidence "regarding the possibility that 
[Tomlinson's] blood alcohol content (BAC) was rising from the time [Tomlinson] 
was driving to the time [he] provided a breath sample." (R., pp.40-41.) In 
support of its motion the state relied primarily on the Idaho Supreme Court's 
opinion in Elias-Cruz, supra. Before trial, the state, citing State v. Edmondson, 
125 Idaho 132, 867 P.2d 1006 (Ct. App. 1994), also moved to exclude any 
evidence of "observable signs of actual intoxication or lack thereof at the time 
[Tomlinson] was stopped." (Trial Tr., p.18, L.15 - p.19, L.4.) The magistrate 
deferred ruling on both of the state's motions. (Trial Tr., p.17, L.4 - p.18, L.4, 
p.19, L.17- p.21, L.2.) 
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The magistrate ultimately addressed the admissibility of certain evidence 
during Officer David Frederick's testimony. During cross-examination of Officer 
Frederick, defense counsel asked about field sobriety tests and the prosecutor 
objected, arguing: "It's evidence of impairment. The State's proceeding on a per 
se theory." (Trial Tr., p.79, Ls.11-15.) Defense counsel responded: 
Judge, the - first of all, the State opened the door by the 
officer said he investigated. And we're allowed, on cross-
examination, to go in and all - into all facts of the direct testimony. 
And it - this investigation is ripe for cross-examination. 
And then, also, the relevant BAC in this case is when the 
defendant was driving. The test was 45 minutes later. So, even 
though the - the State would like you to preclude this evidence 
from coming in, all this is relevant to see what happened in that 45 
minutes from the time he was actually driving until he was given the 
test because, as the Court is well aware, BAC levels go up and 
down. 
So, just because the State wants to proceed on the pro se 
[verbatim] method, that - that doesn't cut it because the defendant 
has a due process right to present evidence and present a case. 
Judge, once again, it's whether the [BAC] reading is 
accurate. And we would argue, if this Court does not allow [sic] to 
go into it, that the Court is essentially telling the jury that this 
reading is accurate, and you're to find him guilty if you find that the 
State proved it was over .08. 
This is a very close blow because it's .082, .083. It's not like 
it was double or over 20. And once again, the jury is the trier of 
fact. They need to determine if this reading is accurate, and if 
there is a margin of error. So, this is all relevant. 
And, once again, the case the State relied on was a 
civil case. 
(Trial Tr., p.81, L.1-p.82, L.9.) 
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The magistrate sustained the state's objection, ruling that evidence 
related to T omlinson's performance on the field sobriety tests was irrelevant. 
(Trial Tr., p.85, L.19- p.86, L.13.) 
Later during his cross-examination, defense counsel asked Officer 
Frederick if he was "familiar with ascending/descending BAC." (Trial Tr., p.97, 
Ls.1-2.) The state objected. (Trial Tr., p.97, Ls.6-8.) In response, defense 
counsel argued, in relevant part: "the State has to account for, and we get to 
argue about the 45 minutes that's relevant between the stop and the time of the 
blow. And that's where it takes it out of the per se analysis, as far as we're 
concerned." (Trial Tr., p.100, Ls.3-8.) Counsel further explained, "we're not 
saying they have to back extrapolate. What we're saying is, it's up to the jury to 
decide what happened in that 45 minutes." (Trial Tr., p.101, Ls.6-9.) Despite 
this explanation, defense counsel later said, "what's relevant in this case is the 
defendant's BAC when he was driving, which was 45 minutes earlier." (Trial Tr., 
p.103, Ls.20-22.) 
The magistrate sustained the state's objection, ruling that the issue was 
"what the actual alcohol concentration was at the time of the test ... not earlier." 
(Trial Tr., p.102, Ls.4-7.) The magistrate also stated, "I don't think back 
extrapolation, or a rising or ascending BAC is ... relevant in the context of a per 
se case," and noted that, in any event, Officer Frederick was not qualified as an 
expert in that regard. (Trial Tr., p.103, Ls.2-16.) 
On intermediate appeal, the district court correctly rejected Tomlinson's 
challenges to the foregoing evidentiary rulings. (R., pp.188-190.) Tomlinson 
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renews his complaints on appeal to this Court. (Appellant's Brief, pp.6-12.) 
Tomlinson's primary arguments appear to be that he was entitled to present 
whatever evidence he believed would cause the jury to question the validity of 
his BAC test results. (See generally Appellant's Brief, pp.6-12.) Tomlinson is 
incorrect. 
[E]vidence which is not relevant is inadmissible, and should be excluded if 
a proper objection is made." Edmondson, 125 Idaho at 134, 867 P.2d at 1008. 
In Elias-Cruz, the Idaho Supreme Court a claim that a hearing officer in an 
administrative license suspension case violated the defendant's due process 
rights "by failing to take into account the margin of error of the Lifeloc FC20." 
153 Idaho at 202-203, 280 P.3d at 705-706. In addressing this issue, the Court 
recited its prior holding in State v. Robinett, 141 Idaho 110, 106 P.3d 436 (2005), 
which was based on the 1984 version of I.C. § 18-8004, that where the state 
"seek[s] to establish a per se violation (the defendant's BAC exceeded the 
statutory limit), then it [is] not necessary to extrapolate the test results back to the 
time the defendant was driving." Elias-Cruz, 153 Idaho at 203, 280 P.3d at 706. 
The Court then reviewed the 1987 amendment to I.C. § 18-8004, which 
eliminated the need for a "determination of alcohol concentration in the blood to 
prove a per se violation," and instead allowed the state to establish such a 
violation "simply by the test results." !9-c at 204, 280 P.3d at 707. Thus, the 
Court observed, that "[a]fter the 1987 amendment, a violation can be shown 
simply by the results of a test for alcohol concentration that complies with the 
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statutory requirements. With that change, the margin of error in the testing 
equipment is irrelevant." kl 
Specifically addressing the legislature's authority to define crimes, the 
Court further stated: 
The legislature has the authority to make driving a motor vehicle 
with any alcohol in one's system a crime and/or a ground for 
suspension of one's driver's license. When the statute declared it 
a crime for a person to drive a motor vehicle with "alcohol in his 
blood" greater than a specified amount, we did not require the 
State to establish the precise of amount of alcohol in the driver's 
blood at the time of driving, even though we knew that the alcohol 
concentration in the driver's blood at the time of the driving could 
be lower than at the time of testing. In essence, we held that the 
driver took the risk that the concentration of alcohol in his blood at 
the time of testing would be greater than it was when he was 
actually driving an hour earlier. After the 1987 amendments, the 
standard is no longer the concentration of alcohol in the driver's 
blood. It is simply the alcohol concentration shown by an approved 
and properly administered test of the driver's breath, blood, or 
urine. Because the actual alcohol concentration in the driver's 
blood is no longer the standard, the testing machine's margin of 
error is irrelevant. 
Elias-Cruz, 153 Idaho at 205-206, 280 P.3d at 708-709. 
The Court in Elias-Cruz made clear that the margin of error for a breath-
testing machine is irrelevant. kl The Idaho Supreme Court also made clear in 
Elias-Cruz, and cases preceding it, that the relevant question under a per se 
theory of driving under the influence is the BAC at the time of the test, not when 
the defendant was driving. kl Tomlinson's response to this is to complain about 
the state's "ad nauseam" reliance on Elias-Cruz, which he believes has no 
application because it is a civil case. (Appellant's Brief, p.11.) Tomlinson further 
asserts that "[i]f the holding in Elias could be construed to apply to criminal 
prosecutions - which it cannot, then it needs to be overturned in the criminal 
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context." (Appellant's Brief, p.11.) Tomlinson, however, cites no cogent reason 
why the Court's analysis in Elias-Cruz would not apply, other than labeling it 
"civil," nor does he cite any relevant legal authority pertaining to the standards for 
overruling precedent. (Appellant's Brief, p.11.) 
There is no reason to believe that the Supreme Court's interpretation of 
I.C. § 18-8004 would be different if it was undertaken in a criminal case as 
opposed to a civil case. Indeed, the state is unaware of any principle, and 
Tomlinson cites none, that would support the proposition that general rules of 
statutory interpretation vary depending on the nature of the case. To the 
contrary, in criminal cases, the Court commonly cites civil cases to support the 
statutory interpretation standards it cites. See, ~. State v. Elias, 2014 WL 
5473537 *2 (2014) (citing Seward v. Pac. Hide & Fur Depot, 138 Idaho 509, 511, 
65 P.3d 531, 533 (2003), St. Luke's Reg'I Med. Ctr., Ltd. v. Bd. of Comm'rs of 
Ada Cnty., and Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg'I Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 892-
93, 265 P.3d 502, 505-06 (2011 )). While the rule of lenity may be unique to 
criminal cases, that rule has no application unless the statute is ambiguous. 
State v. Bradshaw, 155 Idaho 437, 440, 313 P.3d 765, 768 (Ct. App. 2013). 
Tomlinson does not, and has not claimed any ambiguity in I.C. § 18-8004, much 
less one that must be construed in his favor. 
It appears Tomlinson's only argument in support of a different reading of 
I.C. § 18-8004 than the one given to it in Elias-Cruz is based on his constitutional 
rights to due process and to present a defense. (Appellant's Brief, pp.9-10.) It is 
well-settled, however, that there is no constitutional right to present irrelevant 
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evidence. State v. Marks, 156 Idaho 559, _, 328 P.3d 539, 543 (Ct. App. 
2014) (constitutional right to present a defense does not "permit an accused to 
present irrelevant evidence"). The Supreme Court said as much in Elias-Cruz: 
"There is no due process violation in excluding irrelevant evidence. There is no 
constitutional right to drive with alcohol in one's system." 153 Idaho at 205, 280 
P.3d at 708. 
This Court should also reject Tomlinson's claim that Elias-Cruz should be 
"overturned in a criminal context." (Appellant's Brief, p.11.) "The rule of stare 
decisis dictates that we follow [controlling precedent] unless it is manifestly 
wrong, unless it has proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or unless overruling 
it is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy continued 
injustice." State v. Clontz, 156 Idaho 787, _, 331 P.3d 529, 531 (Ct. App. 
2014) (quotations, citations, and brackets omitted). Tomlinson does not cite the 
relevant legal standards for "overturning" precedent, but contends the statement 
in Elias-Cruz that a driver takes "the risk that the concentration of alcohol in his 
blood at the time of testing would be greater than it was when he was actually 
driving," "defies law and logic" because the "statute is clear and unequivocal that 
the relevant BAC is while driving." (Appellant's Brief, p.11.) Tomlinson further 
argues that when the "took the risk" language from Elias-Cruz is applied in a 
criminal context it is "fallacious" because a "citizen is either in violation of the law 
or he is not, and due process requires notice of what said violation of the law is." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.11.) Neither of Tomlinson's arguments have merit. 
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Idaho Code Section § 18-8004 provides the mechanisms for establishing 
a defendant is guilty of driving under the influence. One mechanism is to show 
that the defendant had a blood alcohol concentration of . 08 as established by a 
test conducted pursuant to I.C. § 18-8004(4) and that the defendant drove, or 
was in actual physical control of motor vehicle. I.C. § 18-8004(1 )(a). The statute 
is plain and unambiguous. 
In addition to claiming Elias-Cruz does not apply to his case, Tomlinson 
claims that, under the Court of Appeals' opinion in Edmondson, 125 Idaho 132, 
867 P .2d 1006, he was entitled to present evidence of "ascending/descending 
blood levels" to impeach the reliability of his BAC test results. (Appellant's Brief, 
p.8.) This assertion directly undermines the rule that the relevant BAC is the 
result at the time of the test, not at the time of driving. Nevertheless, the 
magistrate did not preclude Tomlinson from presenting such evidence on this 
basis. Rather, the magistrate rejected Tomlinson's attempt to do this through 
Officer Frederick because he did not qualify as an expert "in that regard." (Trial 
Tr., p.102, L.23 - p.103, L.9.) The transcript supports the magistrate's 
conclusion. While defense counsel repeatedly attempted to elicit testimony from 
Officer Frederick on the scientific principles underlying breath testing and 
metabolizing alcohol, Officer Frederick continually testified that, although he had 
some knowledge of the subject matter, he was "not a scientist." (See generally 
Trial Tr., pp.87-97.) Tomlinson has failed to show error in relation to the 
magistrate's limitations on Tomlinson's efforts to elicit evidence related to 
"ascending/descending blood levels." 
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Tomlinson also argues that he was entitled to present evidence of his 
performance on field sobriety tests. (Appellant's Brief, pp.6, 9.) Even assuming 
such evidence would be relevant in a prosecution under the per se theory of 
driving under the influence, Tomlinson failed to lay any foundation establishing 
that Officer Frederick, or any other witness, could relate Tomlinson's 
performance on field sobriety tests to the accuracy of his BAC test result. 
Instead, Tomlinson's argument at trial in relation to the field sobriety tests was 
based on his claim that "the relevant BAC in this case is when the defendant was 
driving." (Trial Tr., p.81, Ls.7-8.) Because Tomlinson's relevance argument fails 
on its underlying premise, his claim that the magistrate erred in excluding 
evidence of his performance on field sobriety tests also fails. 
D. This Court Should Decline To Consider Tomlinson's Argument Relating 
To The Admissibility Of The BAC Printout; Even If Considered, The 
District Court Correctly Affirmed The Magistrate's Ruling Regarding The 
Admissibility Of The BAC Test Result Printout 
Tomlinson's final argument is that the BAC printout was improperly 
admitted. (Appellant's Brief, p.12.) This Court should decline to consider the 
argument because Tomlinson has failed to support it with argument and 
authority. Even if considered, the argument fails. 
At trial, the state moved to admit Exhibit 4, which was a printout of 
Tomlinson's BAC test results. (Trial Tr., p.60, L.23 - p.61, L.8.) Tomlinson 
objected, arguing the printout was a "police report" that was "prohibited by Idaho 
Rule of Evidence 803(6)(A)." (Trial Tr., p.61, Ls.10-13.) The magistrate 
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overruled the objection and the district court affirmed. (Trial Tr., p.61, Ls.23-24; 
R., pp.190-191.) The district court was correct. 
On appeal, Tomlinson notes he objected to the BAC printout "under IRE 
803(6)(A)" [sic] and argues: "The Judge erroneously ruled that the printout came 
in. The rule and statute are in conflict, when a conflict exists between a rule and 
statute, the rule controls." (Appellant's Brief, p.12.) "A party waives an issue 
cited on appeal if either authority or argument is lacking, not just if both are 
lacking." Murray v. State, 156 Idaho 159, _, 321 P.3d 709, 718 (2014). 
Because Tomlinson has failed to support his argument regarding the BAC 
printout with argument and authority, the claim is waived and this Court should 
decline to consider it. 
Even if considered, Tomlinson's hearsay argument is without merit. Rule 
803(6) of the Idaho Rules of Evidence is an exception to the hearsay rule that 
allows for the admission of "[r]ecords of regularly conducted activity" under 
certain circumstances. Although Tomlinson cites this rule, he also refers to the 
BAC printout as a "police report." (Appellant's Brief, p.12.) Based on this, it 
appears Tomlinson may have intended to cite Rule 803(8), rather than Rule 
803(6)(A) [sic], since Rule 803(8) relates to "[p]ublic records and reports" and 
specifically references "investigative reports by police." I.RE. 803(8). 
Regardless of the hearsay exception Tomlinson meant to rely on, any exception 
is irrelevant because the BAC printout is not hearsay. 
Hearsay is defined as a "statement, other than one made by the declarant 
while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the 
21 
matter asserted." I.RE. 801 (c). A statement includes "an oral or written 
assertion" if it is "intended by the person as an assertion." I.RE. 801 (a). A 
"declarant" is "a person who makes a statement." I.RE. 801 (b). The breath test 
machine is not a declarant or a person. The test results it prints cannot, 
therefore, be deemed hearsay. Tomlinson's claim that the BAC test results were 
inadmissible hearsay fails. 1 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
intermediate appellate decision affirming Tomlinson's conviction for 
misdemeanor DUI. 
DATED this 26th day of November 2014. 
Jl=SSICA M. LORELLO 
Det6uty Attorney General 
1 Tomlinson's reference to the conflict between "the rule and statute" is based on 
the magistrate's and district court's conclusion that the BAC printout was 
admissible pursuant to I.C. § 18-8004(4). (Trial Tr., p.61, Ls.18-20; R, p.190.) 
That section provides, in relevant part, that "[n]otwithstanding any other provision 
of law or rule of court, the results of any test for alcohol concentration ... shall 
be admissible in any proceeding in this state without the necessity of producing a 
witness to establish the reliability of the testing procedure for examination." 
Although this provision allows for admission of the results without calling a 
witness "to establish the reliability of the testing procedure," it is not clear that it 
squarely addresses Tomlinson's hearsay claim. As noted, the state submits that 
Tomlinson's hearsay claim fails under the very rule he cites regardless of the 
language of I.C. § 18-8004(4). This Court can reject Tomlinson's argument on 
this basis alone without interpreting the meaning of the statute or evaluating any 
conflict between the statute and I.RE. 803. See Idaho Schools for Equal 
Educational Opportunity v. Evans, 123 Idaho 573, 580, 850 P.2d 724, 731 
(1993) ("where an order of the district court is correct but based upon an 
erroneous theory, this Court will affirm upon the correct theory"). 
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